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Susan Houseman and Carolyn Heinrich
The Nature and Role of 
Temporary Help Work in 
the U.S. Economy
This article is based on the authors’ working paper, 
“Temporary Help Employment in Recession and 
Recovery,” Upjohn Institute Working Paper No. 15-
227. To read the paper, please visit research.upjohn
.org/up_workingpapers/227/.
Although only about 2 percent of 
wage and salary workers are employed in 
the temporary help industry, temporary 
agencies account for a much larger 
share of the U.S. workforce in blue-
collar occupations and play an outsized 
role in workforce adjustment during 
recessions and recoveries. According to 
data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
8.4 percent of workers in production 
occupations and 16.1 percent of workers 
in material-moving occupations (such 
as warehouse workers and industrial 
truck drivers) are hired through staffi ng 
companies. Refl ecting, in part, the 
concentration of its employment in 
cyclically sensitive occupations, the 
temporary help industry contracted by 
30 percent and accounted for 11 percent 
of net employment losses economy-wide 
during the Great Recession. 
Despite its importance in the macro 
economy, relatively little is known about 
the nature of temporary help work or 
its role in workforce adjustment. This 
information gap results in large part from 
the fact that temporary help agencies 
function as labor market intermediaries, 
contracting out workers to client 
organizations. Although temp agency 
workers work at the clients’ sites, typically 
under the clients’ supervision, they are 
the legal employees of the temporary help 
agency. Government surveys collect no 
information on the industries to which 
temporary agency workers are assigned, 
so we know little about where the work is 
performed and the employment outcomes 
of these workers. 
This article provides insights into the 
nature of temporary help work at one 
of the largest staffi ng companies in the 
United States, using detailed information 
on all temporary orders in the U.S. 
operations of the company from 2007 
to 2011. The temporary help industry 
is diverse, and we do not claim that our 
data are representative of all companies. 
Nevertheless, this company’s practices 
are likely similar to those at other large 
staffi ng companies, and, to the extent that 
this is the case, our data should describe 
an important segment of the industry. 
Where Temporary Help Workers Work
The occupational distribution of 
hours worked in our temporary help 
fi rm is closely comparable to that of 
the temporary help industry in national 
statistics. As in national data, about 
half of employment is in industrial or 
blue-collar occupations, which include 
production occupations and materials-
handling and logistics occupations. 
Together, blue-collar and offi ce 
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occupations account for three-fourths of 
the hours worked in our fi rm. Another 
15 percent of hours are in a variety of 
professional and technical occupations, 
which include jobs in law, health, 
accounting, science, and education. 
Just as in national statistics, the 
temporary help fi rm represented in our 
data does not systematically collect 
information on the industries in which 
their workers are placed. For the years 
2010 and 2011, however, the temporary 
help fi rm linked client names and 
addresses to business lists that include 
industry information. Through this 
process, it was possible to code industry 
for assignments that accounted for 
two-thirds of its temporary help hours 
in these years. Consistent with the 
occupational patterns of temporary help 
workers, a majority of workers were 
placed in industries that heavily utilize 
manual labor. Among temporary help 
hours for which client industry could be 
identifi ed, over half (53 percent) were in 
the manufacturing sector, 7 percent were 
in wholesale trade, and 6 percent were in 
transportation. 
How Temporary Are Temporary 
Help Jobs?
While the name temporary help 
implies short-term assignments, case 
studies and the media have reported 
instances in which workers are on 
assignments for an extended time 
period, a phenomenon dubbed “perma-
temping” (Eisenberg 1999). Our 
data, which include information on 
assignment start and end dates, paint a 
complex picture. As shown in Panel A 
of Figure 1, which plots the distribution 
of assignment lengths for selected 
broad occupations and all assignments 
commencing between 2007 and 2010, 
the large majority of assignments at this 
temporary help fi rm are short. Three-
fourths of all assignments lasted less than 
three months, with over half lasting less 
than one month. Even in assignments 
involving professional and technical 
workers, the duration was less than three 
months in two-thirds of the cases. In 
contrast, 4 percent of all assignments 
commencing during these years lasted 
a year or more; for professional and 
technical workers that fi gure was 9 
percent.
As we discuss below, however, a large 
share of workers are fi red or quit prior to 
the completion of their assignment, which 
skews the distribution of assignment 
length. Moreover, by defi nition, long 
assignments account for a disproportionate 
share of hours worked. Panel B of Figure 
1, which shows the distribution of hours 
worked in temporary assignments by the 
length of those assignments, displays the 
opposite pattern of that in Panel A: long 
assignments account for the majority 
of work performed in the temporary 
help agency. In industrial and offi ce 
occupations, respectively, 28 percent 
and 37 percent of hours worked are in 
assignments lasting at least one year, 
and 52 percent and 59 percent of hours 
worked are in assignments lasting at least 
six months. For professional and technical 
workers, nearly half (49 percent) of the 
work occurred in assignments lasting a 
year or more, and over 70 percent were 
in assignments with a duration of at least 
six months. Thus, while most temporary 
help assignments are short, the majority of 
temporary help work takes place in long-
lasting assignments. 
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Figure 1  Length of Temporary Help Assignments by Broad Occupation, 2007–2010
Panel A: Distribution of Assignment Length (%)
Panel B: Share of Hours Worked by Assignment Length (%)
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Transitions to Permanent Positions 
and Other Outcomes
Temporary help positions often are 
promoted as pathways to permanent 
employment. Client organizations have 
the opportunity to see how a temporary 
agency worker performs on the job and 
may offer workers a permanent position 
following the temp assignment. While this 
screening process typically is informal, 
the temporary help fi rm we study also 
designates certain contracts (about 4 
percent) as “temp-to-hire,” meaning that 
there is an explicit understanding that the 
worker is auditioning for a permanent 
position with the client. In our data, 
about 7 percent of all temporary help 
assignments ended in a hire by the client. 
The hire rate was only slightly higher 
among professional and technical workers 
(8.8 percent) than among offi ce workers 
(8.0 percent) and industrial workers (6.6 
percent). Individuals, of course, may 
work on multiple assignments before they 
fi nd a good match. Over the fi ve-year 
period covered by our data, 15 percent of 
all individuals working for the temp help 
fi rm were ultimately hired by a client. 
Thus, although a sizable share land a 
permanent job via their temp assignment, 
our data suggest that in the large majority 
of cases, fi rms are using temporary help 
agencies to meet a temporary staffi ng 
need. 
Interestingly, even in temp-to-hire 
assignments, less than half ended in a 
hire by the client. Among professional 
and technical workers, 44 percent of 
temp-to-hire assignments ended in a 
hire, and among industrial workers, 
only 22 percent were hired by the client. 
Although turnover of new hires is high in 
industries using industrial workers, our 
analysis indicates that it is considerably 
lower than the implied turnover of those 
in temp-to-hire positions, who spend their 
probationary period on the payroll of the 
temporary agency. With the caveat that 
we cannot control for possible differences 
in the pool of new hires entering from 
temporary help fi rms and new hires 
made directly by employers, our fi ndings 
are consistent with case study evidence 
indicating that use of temporary help 
agencies to screen new hires allows fi rms 
to be more selective (Cappelli 2012; 
Houseman, Kalleberg, and Erickcek 
2003). 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of 
assignment outcomes: fi red or quit, 
hired by the client, otherwise completed 
the assignment, or other outcomes; 
the last category includes the client 
terminating the contract early for reasons 
other than worker performance. Most 
notable is the large share of temp agency 
workers who are fi red or quit before the 
assignment is complete—about one-
third. In industrial occupations, which 
include the lowest-paying jobs, that 
share exceeds 40 percent. Being fi red for 
tardiness or failing to report to work are 
especially common among those in low-
wage occupations. Our data point to a 
signifi cant challenge that temporary help 
agencies have in fi nding good matches 
between workers and organizations. 
Diffi culty recruiting and retaining 
workers in these positions may help 
explain companies’ extensive reliance on 
temporary help agencies to fi ll them. 
Temporary Help in Recession 
and Recovery
The temporary agency company’s data 
span the recession and early years of the 
recovery, and we use it to provide insights 
into the dynamics of temporary help 
employment in recession and recovery. 
Employers’ reliance on temporary help 
staff is most apparent during recessions, 
when many fi rms simultaneously 
experience adverse demand conditions 
and terminate temporary help contracts 
to quickly reduce staffi ng levels. During 
the recession and initial recovery, 
when many are uncertain about future 
economic conditions, employers also may 
disproportionately rely on temporary help 
staff to expand their workforces. Indeed, 
although the temporary help industry 
experienced robust growth following 
the offi cial end of the recession in 2009, 
employment growth in the economy 
overall was weak until 2012. A leading 
hypothesis for that weak aggregate 
employment growth is that companies 
were uncertain about the strength of 
the recovery and were reluctant to take 
on permanent employees (International 
Monetary Fund 2012). Consistent with 
this hypothesis, our model estimates, 
which control for changes in the quality 
of temporary help workers during the 
recession, show that companies reduced 
hiring from the pool of temporary help 
workers and lengthened the duration 
of temporary assignments during the 
recession and initial recovery period. 
The Future of Temporary 
Help Workers
Although unemployment rates have 
returned to prerecession levels, wage 
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Figure 2  Outcomes of Assignments in Temporary Help Agency (% distribution)
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growth is weak, labor force participation 
is historically low, and deep concerns 
remain, particularly about the low-wage 
workforce. Temporary help agencies, 
which hire a disproportionate share of 
low-wage workers, are often touted 
as providing a pathway to permanent, 
better jobs for these workers, yet we see 
strikingly low hire rates in our data, even 
among those in temp-to-hire contracts. 
Low conversion rates to permanent jobs 
with clients refl ect the fact that employers 
are highly selective in making job offers 
to temporary help workers, but they also 
refl ect skills defi cits among the workers. 
Performance problems or quits prior to 
assignment completion drive a signifi cant 
share of temporary help assignment 
terminations, with “soft skill” problems 
such as tardiness and unexcused absences 
notably high among the lower-paid 
temporary workers. In sum, our data 
indicate that the pathway to better jobs 
via temporary help employment currently 
is limited for low-wage workers. 
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Johannes Schmieder and Deborah Goldschmidt
Domestic Outsourcing 
Reduces Wages and 
Contributes to Rising 
Inequality
This article highlights fi ndings from “The Rise of 
Domestic Outsourcing and the Evolution of the Ger-
man Wage Structure,” Upjohn Institute Working 
Paper No. 15-244. To read the paper, please visit 
research.upjohn.org/up_workingpapers/244/. 
The last three decades have seen a 
thorough transformation of the nature 
of the labor market, with large fi rms 
increasingly relying on nontraditional 
employment arrangements such as 
outsourcing, temporary or contingent 
work, offshoring, and subcontracting. 
Across a wide range of industries, 
fi rms have been focusing on their 
“core competencies” and hiring outside 
companies to provide services that were 
once performed by their own employees, 
such as cleaning, security, logistics, human 
resources, or information technology. 
Outsourcing to business service 
providers potentially allows for reductions 
in wages for the contracted-out jobs. The 
outsourcing fi rms are often traditional 
lead companies in sectors such as 
manufacturing or fi nance, and they 
typically offer the most attractive jobs, 
with higher wages, increased job security, 
strong worker representation, and union 
coverage. Large employers may thus 
fi nd it benefi cial to reduce the number 
of direct employees who benefi t from 
such wage premia by outsourcing jobs to 
subcontractors. These business service 
fi rms compete fi ercely with each other for 
service contracts from large companies 
on price, and since labor costs are a large 
share of business service fi rms’ total costs, 
this creates intense pressure to lower 
wages and reduce benefi ts. 
We analyze domestic labor service 
outsourcing in Germany using detailed 
administrative data on workers and fi rms. 
We use the term domestic outsourcing 
rather than offshoring, as it refers to a 
form of outsourcing where the service 
provider is located in the same country. 
We document for the fi rst time in detail 
the increase in outsourced labor services 
over the last three decades in Germany, 
focusing in particular on cleaning, 
security, logistics, and food services. 
Figure 1 shows the share of all full-
time workers in business service fi rms 
that provide cleaning, security, and 
logistics services, as well as temporary 
help agencies. In 1975 only 2 percent 
of the German labor force worked for 
such companies, but that number almost 
quadrupled by 2008 to around 7 percent. 
A substantial share of this rise is due to 
the growth in both temp agency work and 
business service fi rms. Since employment 
in cleaning, security, and logistics 
occupations has remained relatively 
constant, this suggests that a much larger 
share of these occupations are now 
working for contractors. 
In order to obtain credible effects of 
outsourcing on wages, we develop a new 
method of identifying a particular type 
of outsourcing—on-site outsourcing—
which refers to situations where a large 
employer spins out a group of workers 
providing a particular service, such as 
cafeteria workers, to a legally separate 
business unit, such as a subsidiary or an 
existing business service provider. In these 
situations the outsourced workers still 
work together and do essentially the same 
job at the same physical location but for 
a different employer. Such outsourcing 
events can be identifi ed in administrative 
data sets using worker fl ows between 
establishments. 
The basic intuition is that if a group 
of workers is contracted out at the same 
time, this can be observed by following 
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the establishment identifi ers as well 
as occupation and industry codes. For 
example, if a group of workers splits off 
from a large bank in year t − 1 and forms a 
new establishment identifi er in year t with 
an industry code of “cafeteria,” this likely 
indicates that the bank is outsourcing its 
cafeteria staff. We compare workers who 
are outsourced in these on-site outsourcing 
events to workers in the same occupation 
and industry who are not outsourced and 
estimate how their wages change over 
time. 
Figure 2 shows the main estimates 
of outsourcing’s effect on wages. While 
wages of both groups of workers move 
in parallel up to the year of outsourcing 
(year 0 in the fi gure), they drop for the 
outsourced workers as soon as outsourcing 
occurs by about 2.5 percent. The wage 
differential then keeps growing until it 
reaches about 10 percent, approximately 
5–10 years after outsourcing. This 
suggests large and long-lasting wage 
differentials between outsourced and 
in-house jobs. Since these differences 
also imply that outsourcing may lead to 
substantial cost savings to employers, we 
investigate whether fi rms that pay higher 
wages relative to the market have a higher 
likelihood of outsourcing any of their 
labor services, and we do indeed fi nd that 
fi rms are signifi cantly more likely to do 
so the more they pay above market-level 
wages.
Finally, we consider the relationship 
between the documented impacts of 
outsourcing in Germany and the broad 
changes in the country’s wage structure 
over the last three decades. Dustmann et 
al. (2014) document a dramatic decline of 
real wages at the lower end of the wage 
distribution since the early 2000s. After a 
decade of stagnation from 1990 to 2000, 
real wages at the 15th percentile fell by 
around 10 percent between 2000 and 
2008.
 Furthermore, Card, Heining, and 
Kline (2013) observe that low-skill 
workers are increasingly working 
at low-paying establishments and 
are increasingly concentrated in 
establishments with homogenous 
workforces where most workers have 
similar occupations. Outsourcing provides 
a natural explanation for this, since it 
typically involves outsourcing low-skill 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
NOTE: The blue lines represent 95 percent confi dence intervals. The fi gure shows the evolution of 
wages for outsourced workers in food, cleaning, security, and logistics occupations relative to the 
wages of workers in the same occupations and industries who are not outsourced. Year 0 is the 
fi rst year of outsourcing. The y-axis is measured in fraction of relative wage losses to obtain the 
wage loss in percent multiply by 100.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 1  Fraction of Full-Time Workers in Germany in Cleaning, Security, or 
Logistics Business Service Firms or Temp Agencies, by Year
Figure 2  The Effect of Outsourcing on Log Wages of Outsourced Workers in Germany 
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workers to very competitive low-paying 
establishments. In addition, outsourcing 
provides a natural explanation for the 
increase in occupational sorting: since 
business service fi rms are much more 
homogenous (for example, in the typical 
cleaning fi rm, about 60 percent of the 
employees are cleaners), moving workers 
from heterogeneous lead employers to 
business service fi rms that employ largely 
the same occupations as the outsourced 
worker will increase the overall 
occupational assortativeness. 
 We quantify the contribution of 
outsourcing to the rise in wage inequality 
in Germany using a reweighting 
method, which allows us to calculate 
a counterfactual distribution of wages 
in Germany under the scenario that 
outsourcing did not increase since the 
1980s. Figure 3 shows the evolution 
of different percentiles of the wage 
distribution relative to 1985. Especially 
for low wages, outsourcing contributed 
substantially to the increase in inequality. 
Overall we show that about 9 percent of 
the increase in inequality can be accounted 
for by the increase in outsourcing of 
just these four occupations. Since many 
other tasks experienced an increase in 
outsourcing, this should be viewed as a 
lower bound with the overall contribution 
of all forms of outsourcing to wage 
inequality possibly being much larger. 
The labor market has seen a fundamental 
restructuring in recent decades, with lead 
employers increasingly contracting out 
parts of their noncore labor force. 
This reorganization of the production 
structure changes the employment 
relationship for a large share of the 
workforce. As more workers become 
employed by specialized business service 
fi rms, they fi nd themselves working for 
companies that provide narrow products 
and compete fi ercely with similar fi rms 
for contracts with lead companies. This 
creates pressure to reduce costs and lower 
wages, which likely makes up a large 
share of input costs among these types of 
business service providers. 
This restructuring also drastically 
changes the bargaining environment, as 
the price competition among business 
service fi rms makes it diffi cult for 
outsourced workers to bargain for a share 
of the fi rm rents at the lead company. In 
this article, we provide careful estimates 
of how this translates into lower wages 
for outsourced workers, and we fi nd 
that across a wide range of measures, 
outsourcing reduces wages by around 
10 percent. Our method implies that this 
is not due to selection of different types 
of workers in outsourced employment 
relationships or to differences in the 
types of jobs that outsourced workers 
do. Instead, it appears that outsourced 
workers receive lower pay because they 
are excluded from fi rm rents that are being 
paid to workers at the lead companies.
It is diffi cult to know why fi rms decide 
to outsource parts of their workforces, 
but our evidence indicates that fi rms that 
pay wage premia to their workers are 
more likely to outsource. This suggests 
that saving on labor costs is part of the 
motivation, but other reasons include 
comparative advantage of business service 
fi rms in their specialty, cost savings 
through economies of scale, and gains in 
effi ciency through market pressures in 
the competitive environment of bidding 
for service contracts. It is even more 
diffi cult to know what is driving the long-
term increase in outsourcing. Changes 
in management philosophy (e.g., a move 
toward emphasis on shareholder value in 
the 1980s and 1990s) may be of similar 
importance as the development of new 
technologies makes it easier to rely on 
contractors. Understanding this is beyond 
the scope of this project but a fruitful area 
for future research. 
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signature
credit card #
expiration date
phone
Book/Author Qty Cloth Qty Paper Total Price
Guild-Ridden Labor Markets  ___ @ $14.99 __________
 Kleiner  
Promise Nation   ___ @ $14.99 __________
 Miller-Adams
Privatizing Railroad Retirement   ___ @ $14.99 __________
 Sass
From Preschool to Prosperity   ___ @ $14.99 __________
 Bartik
The New Scarlet Letter?   ___ @ $14.99 __________
 Raphael
          Subtotal  $  __________
Shipping/Handling
 U.S.A. and Canada: $5.00 fi rst book, $2.00 each additional book.          Plus Shipping $ __________
 Elsewhere: $7.00 fi rst book, $2.00 each additional book.                        
            TOTAL $ __________
SHIP TO:
Name Organization
Address                                                                    City                          State                    Zip
BILL TO: (Must attach purchase order)
Name Organization
Address                                                                    City                          State                    Zip
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